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1 Introduction
One of the more frequent discussions in monetary economics is the
evaluation of central bank policy, specifically the actions of the United
States Federal Reserve (the Fed). Among various tools for analysis, the
simple Taylor Rule is very popular. Using graphical evidence, Taylor
(1993) models the Federal Funds Rate as a linear function of inflation
and the output gap. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Orphanides
(2001) modernize the Taylor Rule. These authors construct a rule which
better describes the actions of the Fed and provides a deterministic
system for the macroeconomy. However, although both inflation and
the output gap are widely accepted as components of this reaction
function, there is no consensus as to whether additional variables should
be included.
Consider that some papers, such as Hayford and Malliaris (2004)
and Rigobon and Sack (2003), argue for the inclusion of asset prices
in the reaction function. Similar to Taylor’s analysis, these arguments
are predominantly empirically motivated. By comparison, theoretically
driven reaction functions, like those found in Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1999), fail to suggest a relationship between the Federal Funds Rate
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and asset prices. In fact, some authors, including Benjamin Bernanke,
construct theoretical arguments against a central bank’s consideration
of asset prices. Thus, the necessity for including asset prices in a re-
action function is questionable, and in this thesis, I employ formal
statistical tests to determine whether asset prices have indeed played a
major role in Fed policies.
2 The Policy Rule
As summarized in Clarida et al. (1999), a policy rule is a course of action
chosen by a central bank for an indefinite time horizon. The policy rule
is typically chosen through some type of optimization. The alternative
to a policy rule is discretion, defined as the formulation of a new policy
action in each and every time period. That is, a policy rule requires a
commitment to an action while discretion does not require commitment,
and this distinction results in drastically different outcomes. This paper
will not consider discretionary actions, however, since a policy rule
tends to generate more effective monetary policy. Such effectiveness is
largely driven by credibility gained from holding to the policy rule1.
1Clarida et al. (1999) provides an excellent summary of the macroeconomic consequences of both
discretionary-based and rule-based monetary policy.
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There are several formulations of policy rules, or reaction functions,
with the first such rule proposed by Taylor (1993). In his paper, Taylor
observed that inflation and the output gap tends to drive, or predict,
the short-term interest rate set by the Fed. As demonstrated in Figure
(1), there appears to be linear relationships among these variables over
the period from 1987 to 1992. Based on this graphical evidence, Tay-
lor (1993) suggests the following reaction function for the short-term
interest rates set by the Fed
r = p+ .5y + .5(p− 2) + 2 (1)
where r denotes the Fed Funds Rate, p is the percentage change in in-
flation, and y is the annualized percent change in the difference between
GDP and potential GDP. This elegant rule still serves as a baseline sug-
gestion for monetary policy. Over time, however, certain refinements
have been suggested to create a more effective rule.
Although Taylor (1993) takes an atheoretical approach to the reac-
tion function, subsequent monetary economic literature provides a the-
oretical derivation of the reaction function. Under a New Keynesian
framework, Clarida et al. (1999) demonstrates that the optimal path,
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as per the objective function of a central bank, is that of a Taylor-like
rule2. The New Keynesian assumption is paramount to this construc-
tion since it allows for nominal price rigidites. Without sticky prices,
monetary policy has no effect on the real short-term real interest rate,
and hence cannot stabilize prices when inflation deviates from its tar-
get.
3 Modern Reaction Functions
Although the modern reaction function still relates the short-term in-
terest rate with inflation and output, current adaptations of the policy
rule are far from simple. Taking advantage of more advanced statistical
techniques, the modern empirical reaction function is forward-looking
and dynamic. Additionally, the inflationary and output variables have
been reinterpreted.
3.1 Time Horizon
Consider that Taylor (1993) formulates a backward-looking rule such
that the Federal Funds Rate in quarter t is a function of inflation and
2Clarida et al. (1999) assumes that the central bank’s objective function is quadratic. Although
this assumption is often made throughout the literature, Surico (2007) and Cukierman and Muscatelli
(2002) explore non-quadratic objective functions. Ultimately, they derive reaction functions which
are biased against inflation or recession.
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the output gap in quarter t − 1. In contrast, a forward-looking rule is
one in which the Fed Funds Rate for quarter t is a function of variables
dated in quarter t+k, for some integer k. The literature favors forward-
looking rules since it is well accepted that the actions of a central bank
have a lagged affect. Although the structure of the reaction function is
flexible with respect to the time horizon, the current consensus is that
monetary policy is most effective when k = 4. As a result, expected
values of inflation and output are used in the modern reaction function
in the place of past values of these variables.
3.2 Inflation Targeting
Although many controversies exist in the literature on monetary eco-
nomics, almost all agree that inflation targeting is important if policy
is to be effective. Indeed, Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) provide a very
compelling argument for inflation targeting, and Clarida et al. (2000)
and Orphanides (2001) attempt to integrate inflation targeting into
their model. However, in spite of its importance, an inflation target
is troublesome to identify. Consider that the Fed never publicly states
their inflation targets (or even whether they actively practice inflation
targeting), and as such, any target is merely surmised from actions of
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the Fed. There are, however, clever solutions to this problem that I
will address later in this thesis.
3.3 The Output Gap
Essential to constructing the output gap is the approximation of poten-
tial ouput. Taylor (1993), Hayford and Malliaris (2004), Clarida et al.
(2000) and Orphanides (2001) first project the log of Real GDP on a
polynomial function of time to obtain Potential GDP. The output gap
is then calculated as the difference between Real GDP and Potential
GDP.
In contrast, some authors prefer to derive Potential GDP from a
structural equation like a Cobb-Douglas Production Function or the
Philip’s Curve (for Potential GDP and NAIRU respectively). Descrip-
tions of these methods can be found in Judd and Rudebusch (1998).
Additionally, Potential Output can be derived from Okun’s Law by
using the rate of change of unemployment. Clark (1982) and Braun
(1990) provide a detailed description of this process.
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3.4 The Implied Policy Rule
Although the original Taylor Rule is empirically appealing, given the
discussion in the preceding section and the theoretical work of Clarida
et al. (1999), it is evident that the Taylor Rule can be expanded and
generalized. Under the New Keynesian framework, the nominal short-
term interest rate affects the real short-term interest rate. Hence the
equivalence relation
rr∗t ≡ rt − E[pit,k | Ωt] (2)
where rr∗t is the target real rate in quarter t, rt is the actual interest
rate in quarter t, and E[pit,k | Ωt] is the expected inflation in quarter k
conditional upon the information known in quarter t (Ωt).
I wish to construct a rule that incorporates real rates. I equate the
target level of the real short-term interest rate to its equilibrium level
in terms of desired output and inflation. As above, I incorporate the
expected levels of output and inflation, such that
rr∗t = rr
∗ + (β − 1)(E[pit,k | Ωt]− pi∗) + γE[xt,q | Ωt] (3)
where rr∗ is the equilibrium target short-term interest rate, E[xt,q |
Ωt] is the expected output gap in quarter t + q, and rr
∗ ≡ r∗ − pi∗.
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Furthermore, I assume that rr∗ is independent of monetary factors in
the long-run, as such, rr∗ is constant.
By equations 2 and 3, it is evident that the Fed sets the nominal Fed
Funds rate each period in an attempt to achieve the optimal Fed Funds
rate. That is, equation 3 is a difference equation that the Fed commits
to so that rr∗t → rr∗ as t → ∞. Additionally, by setting k = q = −1,
equation 3 reduces to the real equivalent of equation 1 with arbitrary
coefficients. Thus, equation 3 generalizes the Taylor Rule and provides
a means for a central bank to obtain economic equilibrium.
An immediate consequence of equation 3 is stable monetary policy.
As described in Clarida et al. (2000), effective monetary policy requires
a postive relationship between the interest rate and both inflation and
the output gap. Thus, it is ideal for γ > 0 and β > 1, and this provides
us a benchmark for evaluating reaction functions with γ = 0 and β = 1.
3.5 Short-term Interest Rate
As Clarida et al. (2000) observe, the above policy rule is still too limiting
because it “assumes an immediate adjustment of the actual Funds rate
to its target level, and thus ignores the Federal Reserve’s tendency
to smooth changes in interest rates.” In other words, the rate set
9
by the Fed is not the nominal target in quarter t, but rather a linear
combination of the nominal target rate and interest rates from previous
quarters. As in Clarida et al. (2000), the rule for setting the Federal
Funds rate is assumed to be:
rt = ρ(L)rt−1 + (1− ρ)r∗t (4)
where r∗t is the target nominal rate in quarter t, ρ(L) is a lag operator
polynomial of order n − 1, and ρ ∈ [0, 1], which can be interpreted as
a degree of smoothing. Hence, through augmenting 3 with equation 4,
the Fed commits to a dynamic process of setting the Fed Funds rate,
though the rate change is no longer immediate.
Parenthetically, Rudebusch (1995) provides empirical evidence of
the serial correlation in interest rates, and Goodfriend (1991) and Sack
(1998) provide theoretical justification that one lag is sufficient to smooth
interest rates.
Equations 2, 3, and 4 all contain some form of a target interest rate.
As the Fed’s main instrument of policy, implicitly there exists such a
target. However, the target short-term interest rate is never stated by
the Fed, and thus it is difficult to empirically identify the true target
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level of the Fed’s instrument.
To combat this identification problem, Judd and Rudebusch (1998)
suggests the combination of the equilibrium short-term interest rate
and the inflation target and their coefficients into some constant, that
can be empirically estimated. From there, Judd proposes a simple
benchmark for the equilibrium short-term interest rate as the average
of the rate that prevailed historically over periods where the start and
end inflation rates were similar. Hence, with this assumption for rr∗
and an estimate for β and the aforementioned constant, an inflation
target can be identified.
3.6 The Modern Reaction Function
Although equation 3 provides a functional form for the real short-term
interest rate, for empirical purposes, the modern reaction function is
given in nominal terms. Hence, I rewrite equation 3 in nominal terms
as:
r∗t = r
∗ + (β − 1)(E[pit,k | Ωt]− pi∗) + γE[xt,q | Ωt] (5)
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By substituting equation 5 into equation 4 and recalling that rr∗+pi∗ ≡
r∗:
rt = (1− ρ)[α + βpit,k + γxt,q] + ρ(L)rt−1 + t (6)
t = −(1− ρ){β(pit,k − E[pit,k | Ωt]) + γ(xt,q − E[xt,q | Ωt])} (7)
α = rr∗ − (β − 1)pi∗ (8)
Equations 6 – 8 define the modern reaction function and are the
baseline for the rest of this paper. Clarida et al. (2000) use equations 6
and 7 to establish an orthogonality condition and estimate the param-
eters using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
4 Asset Prices
Pivotal to Clarida et al. (1999) is the assumption that a central bank
only targets output and inflation. The bulk of the monetary economics
literature reflects this assumption; however, it is plausible to consider
additional targets. Asset prices are an intuitive third target, and, as
such, their relevance to monetary policy is the focus the remainder of
this paper. Alan Greenspan has even mused the issue. In Greenspan
(1996), he ponders,
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But what about future prices or more importantly prices of
claims on future goods and services, like equities, real estate,
or other earning assets? Is stability of these prices essential
to the stability of the economy?
Although there does not exist a derivation of an asset price augmented
reaction function along the lines of Clarida et al. (1999), there is a
wealth of theoretical and empirical evidence both for and against an
alternative reaction function. Additionally, we can distinguish between
normative and positive discussions on the relevancy of asset prices to
monetary policy.
4.1 Normative Arguments
Of the normative literature, there are two distinct groups. Headed by
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001), the
detractors argue that asset price targeting is unnecessary. They claim
that inflation targeting is optimal no matter the state of the financial
sector. The proponent group, led by Cecchetti (1998), argues that asset
price targeting can improve the efficancy of monetary policy.
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4.1.1 Opponents
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that inflation targeting sufficiently
stabilizes asset prices and thus any targeting of asset prices by a central
bank is useless. Their argument is that maintaining constant levels of
current and expected inflation is equivalent to sustaining output at its
natural level. However, when a bubble exists, either there is no effect
on aggregate demand or the bubble causes an increase in aggregate
demand through the wealth effect. In both scenarios, the monetary
policy prescribed through inflation targeting is the optimal response.
They further critique that due to the difficulty in observing a stock
market bubble a priori, any such asset price targeting is misguided.
Bullard and Schaling (2002) take a different approach. They con-
struct a macroeconomic model under which the central bank targets
equity prices in addition to output and inflation. With this model,
they find that asset price targeting can interfere with the minimization
of inflation and output variation. Further, under certain conditions,
asset price targeting can lead to indeterminacy. They conclude that
the targeting of equity prices leads to supraoptimal levels of inflation
and the output gap.
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4.1.2 Proponents
At odds with Bernanke and Gertler (1999) is Cecchetti (1998), who ar-
gues for the targeting of asset of prices. Cecchetti and et al (2000) claim
that by considering asset prices, a central bank can improve economic
performance. Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwami (2003) examine how
the end of a bubble can lead to unnatural levels of either inflation or
deflation.
Blanchard (2000) directly addresses Bernanke and Gertler (1999)
and makes a case for asset price targeting. He asserts that stock mar-
ket bubbles can lead to increased capital accumulation, an economic
condition which inflation targeting cannot combat. Therefore, in this
case, asset price ought to be included as a third target of monetary of
policy.
In addition to Blanchard (2000), Bordo and Jeanne (2001) take ex-
ception to Bernanke and Gertler (1999). They find that in cases of
extreme financial instability, as in the United States in 1929 and Japan
during the 1990’s, ignorance of asset prices can worsen already grim
levels of output. Mishkin (2000) agrees with Bordo and Jeanne (2001)
and claims that monetary policy should attempt to prevent financial
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collapses.
4.2 Positive Arguments
In contrast to the preceding subsection, Rigobon and Sack (2003) ex-
plore whether the Federal Reserve did target asset prices. They surmise
that monetary policy reacts significantly to changes in the stock mar-
ket. They found that a 5 percent rise (fall) in the S & P 500 increases
the likelihood of a 25 basis-point tightening (easing) of the Fed Funds
rate by about 50 percent. Rigobon and Sack attribute this result to
monetary policy anticipating stock market movements; however, they
admit that this conclusion should be taken cautiously.
Hayford and Malliaris (2004) test the relationship between stock
market bubbles and the Fed Funds rate. They construct an asset price
augmented reaction, similar to Clarida et al. (2000), where they include
the P/E ratio as their financial variable. Hayford and Malliaris find a
significant, negative relationship between the P/E ratio and the Federal
Funds rate. Thus, they conclude that through the 1990’s, the Federal
Reserve accommodated the formulation of stock market bubbles.
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5 Empirical Strategy and Results
Given the mixed normative arguments and limited positive arguments,
the role of asset prices in monetary policy is still unclear. Therefore, this
paper estimates a forward-looking reaction function similar to Clarida
et al. (2000) and Hayford and Malliaris (2004).
I take equations 6, 7, and 8 and incorporate asset prices
rt = (1− ρ)[α + βpit,k + γxt,q + δst,j] + ρ(L)rt−1 + t (9)
t = −(1−ρ){β(pit,k−E[pit,k | Ωt])+γ(xt,q−E[xt,q | Ωt])+(δst,j−E[st,j | Ωt])}
(10)
α = rr∗ − (β − 1)pi∗ − δs∗ (11)
where st,j is the level of asset prices in quarter t+ j and s
∗ is the target
asset price level, or the fundamental price. I thus assume that the Fed
can compute the fundamental price. Of course, there is no consensus as
to whether the Fed can observe the fundamental price a priori, though,
Blanchard (2000) does argue that the Fed can actually recognize the
existence of a bubble.
Equations 9 and 10 provide conditions for the empirical reaction
function. In equation 10, each grouping of variables — output, infla-
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tion, and asset prices — are each the difference of observed levels from
expected levels. Therefore t is orthogonal to any variable in Ωt.
Then by letting zt be a vector of instruments known in quarter t,
i.e. zt ∈ Ωt, equations 9 and 10 establish the orthogonality condition
E{[rt − (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q + δst,j) + ρ(L)rt−1]zt} = 0 (12)
Equation 12 allows for the estimation of α, β, γ, δ, and ρ using the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure of Hansen (1982).
By construction, t follows an MA(a) process, where a = max[k, q, j]−
1. Therefore, unless k = q = j = 1, t will be serially correlated. As
such, for GMM estimation, an optimal weighting matrix which accounts
for this serial correlation should be employed.
The data used are quarterly time series from 1981:1 to 2008:3. All
financial data are obtained from Yahoo Finance and all other data is
obtained from FRED. For the short-term interest rate, I use the average
of the Federal Funds rate in the first month of each quarter. Inflation is
measured using the annualized rate of change between two quarters of
the GDP Deflator. The output gap is calculated using real and potential
GDP. FRED determines potential GDP in accordance with the CBO
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
rt 6.08 3.52 1.00 19.08
pit 2.98 1.62 1.10 10.20
xt -0.77 2.23 -7.67 4.54
st 0.11 0.16 -0.25 0.53
method described earlier. The financial variable is the annualized rate
of change of the average level of the S&P 500 index in the first month
of each quarter3. The set of instruments includes lags of the Fed Funds
rate, inflation, the output gap, the S&P 500, and lags of M2 growth and
the spread between long-term bonds and three month T-Bills. Table 1
provides descriptive statistics of the Federal Funds rate and the three
target variables.
I first estimate the reaction function without asset prices. Equations
6 – 7 produce the orthogonality condition
E{[rt − (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q + ρ(L)rt−1]zt} = 0 (13)
3Orphanides (2001) shows that ex ante data can lead to mispecified reaction functions. Since
most major macroeconomic time series – especially GDP – tend to be revised quarters after they are
published, the use of “real-time” data in estimation results in different predicted rates. Clarida et
al. (2000) and Hayford and Malliaris (2004) show that although revised data prescribes inaccurate
short-term interest rates, there is no significant difference in the estimated coefficients. Additionally,
this “real-time” data is published with a seven-year lag. As such, this paper opts to only consider
revised data.
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Table 2: Results for 1981:1 – 2006:1 Without Asset Prices
(k, q, j)
Coefficient (1, 1, 1) (4, 4, 4) (−1,−1,−1)
α -3.99* -13.05*** 3.41*
[-1.77] [-2.76] [1.73]
β 3.72*** 7.06*** 0.62
[4.16] [4.04] [0.85]
γ 1.32*** 2.89*** 0.45
[3.99] [3.71] [1.16]
ρ 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.89***
[52.91] [41.02] [20.60]
pi∗ 3.70 3.16 –
R2 0.96 0.94 0.94
Hansen J-Statistic p-value 0.37 0.16 –
z & t statistics in brackets
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
just like the asset price augmented function, where α is defined by
equation 8 instead of equation 11. Table 2 presents regression results for
the period of 1981:1 to 2006:1. The two forward-looking specifications
– in the first two columns – employ GMM estimation.
Since in a backward-looking rule all targets are known, there is no
need for instruments, and hence I employ OLS. Under both of the
forward-looking specifications, the reaction function meets the stability
requirement – that is, β > 1 and γ > 0. However, in the backword-
looking model, β < 1.
Table 2 also includes the implied inflation target, calculated by using
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the sample average of the Fed Funds rate as a first approximation to
rr∗. The values of 3.16 and 3.70 are consistent with the findings in
Clarida et al. (2000). In all three models, R2 is at least 0.94 and for
both GMM estimations, the J-Statistic p-values are large enough to fail
to reject the null of over indentification.
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the asset price augmented
reaction function specifications. In the first two specifications, both β
and γ are greater than 1 and 0 respectively. By comparison, in the
backward-looking specification, α and γ fail to be significant. In all
three specifications, there is a great deal of inertia in rate changes,
as ρ > 0.80 in each case. Hence, interest-rate changes are largely a
function of the interest rate in the previous quarter, as opposed to the
target for the current quarter. As with the reaction functions estimated
in Table 2, the estimated asset prices augmented reaction function have
R2 values near one and large p-values for the J-statistic. Largely, these
results are consistent with the specifications that do not include asset
prices.
For both the forward and backward-looking models, δ is highly sig-
nificant and surprisingly large. Furthermore, the R2’s from Table 2
indicate that the specifications without asset prices have just as good
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Table 3: Results for 1981:1 – 2006:1 With Asset Prices
(k, q, j)
Coefficient (1, 1, 1) (4, 4, 4) (−1,−1,−1)
α -3.36** -9.16*** 1.41
[-2.12] [-3.05] [1.03]
β 3.04*** 4.94*** 0.99**
[5.04] [4.74] [2.04]
γ 1.12*** 1.73*** 0.31
[4.73] [3.67] [1.10]
δ 7.84** 16.38*** 10.10**
[2.35] [2.64] [2.50]
ρ 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.85***
[37.93] [39.88] [19.55]
R2 0.95 0.94 0.94
Hansen J-Statistic p-value 0.45 0.65 –
z & t statistics in brackets
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
a fit as those which do include asset prices.
It is a bit more difficult to obtain estimates of the implied target. In
particular, when including asset prices, the method found in Judd and
Rudebusch (1998) can no longer be used. In other words, estimates for
α and rr∗ are not sufficient to identify both pi∗ and δ∗.
Table 4 presents a loci of plausible values for pi∗ and s∗ for the two
forward-looking models. I ignore the backward-looking model since α
and γ are not significant from zero. Given pi∗, s∗ is increasing in pi∗
for the one-quarter-ahead model, and decreasing for the four-quarter-
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Table 4: Loci Results
(1, 1, 1) (4, 4, 4)
pi∗ s∗
0 0.98 0.94
1 1.04 0.70
3.5 1.20 0.10
5.0 1.29 -0.26
10.0 1.61 -1.47
ahead model. These values seem quite reasonable. Observe that when
pi∗ is near p¯it = 2.98, s∗ is near s¯t = 0.11.
To further test the asset price augmented reaction function, I fore-
cast both the original estimated reaction function and the asset price
augmented reaction function into the first six quarters of Chairman
Bernanke’s term4. As documented in Section 4, Chairman Bernanke’s
publication record suggest a tempered, if not absent, enthusiasm for as-
set price targeting. Table 5 explores these forecast results, presenting
the mean absolute deviation of the forecasted results from the vintage
rates. As indicated in this table, the mean absolute deviations are
not significantly different across specification. This is not especially
surprising, considering the similarly high R2’s for each specification.
4I use the four quarter-ahead specfication in both cases.
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Table 5: Forecast Results
Mean Absolute Deviation
Without 0.54
With 0.59
6 Conclusion
The results from Table 3 provide optimistic results; however, evidence
of asset price targeting is ambiguous at best. Although the results
suggest that the asset price augmented reaction function is a good fit
for the data, it does not appear to provide additional explanatory power
when compared to the reaction function found in Clarida et al. (2000).
As a corollary to the results, there are at least two related research
questions. First, given a larger sample of economic data from Chair-
man Bernanke’s term, observe that with sufficient sample sizes, proper
standard errors can be constructed. This allows for a Chow Test.
Second, Clarida et al. (2000) provides a simple macroeconomic model
derived through inflation and output gap targeting. Under a New Key-
nesian framework and given a reaction function as described in 6 and
7, the following is their deterministic model for macroeconomic equi-
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librium:
pit = ηE[pit+1 | Ωt] + λ(yt − zt) (14)
yt = E[yt+1 | Ωt]− (1/σ)rt − E[pit+1 | Ωt] + gt (15)
r∗t = βE[pit+1 | Ωt) + γxt (16)
rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)r∗t (17)
where yt is the log of output, zt is potential output, gt is an exogeneous
demand factor, and xt = yt − zt (i.e. the output gap). The parameters
β, γ, and ρ are identical to the coefficients found in equation 6, though
η, λ, and σ are non-policy parameters that must be set a priori. As
indicated by equation 3, the reaction function provides conditions for
economic equilibrium. In contrast, equations 14 – 17 provide a struc-
tural description of the implications of monetary policy on the economy.
Through time, a central bank commits to a recursive process of setting
rt in an attempt to achieve rt = rr
∗, pit,k = pi∗, and yt = zt. Clarida
et al. (2000) simulate this model, choosing η, λ, and σ and using their
various estimates for β, γ and ρ to investigate how various policy rules
impact the macroeconomy. Future research could augment equation
16 to include asset prices to simulate the impact of asset price reac-
25
tion functions on the macroeconomy. This allows for a more insightful
comparison of the two classes of reaction functions.
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